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Misconduct Hearing Outcome for accessing police files
An officer has been dismissed after accessing police files relating to the disappearance and murder of Sarah Everard.
A former officer, who had previously resigned, would have been dismissed had she still been serving. A third officer was handed a final written warning.
The gross misconduct panel, chaired by an independent legally qualified chair, found that PC Myles McHugh, former Detective Constable Hannah Rebbeck and Sergeant Mark Harper had accessed information which was not undertaken in the course of their duties and/or had no proper policing purpose for doing so.
The panel heard that PC McHugh accessed the information while off duty and for a significant period of time, while former DC Hannah Rebbeck was found to have repeatedly accessed sensitive data without any link to her duties. These breaches of professional standards were so serious that the only appropriate outcome was dismissal.
Sgt Harper was handed a final written warning, to last for three years.
Detective Constable Tyrone Ward, former Inspector Akinwale Ajose-Adeogun and former Detective Sergent Robert Butters also faced the same misconduct hearing. Based on the evidence heard, the panel concluded that they did have a legitimate reason for accessing the relevant information and consequently did not breach the standards of police professional behaviour.
Another serving officer will face a separate gross misconduct hearing on a date to be set.
A member of police staff previously faced a private gross misconduct hearing and was dismissed.
None of the officers or staff had direct involvement in the criminal investigation into the murder of Sarah Everard, and no evidence was found that any individual had inappropriately shared information with any other individual.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Cundy said: “Today as always, our thoughts remain with Sarah Everard’s family and friends. We have apologised to them for the added distress this case has caused and I recognise the wider questions and concerns this raises.
“Our officers and staff are regularly reminded that police systems and specific files must only be accessed where there is a legitimate policing purpose to do so. This includes reminder screens and warning pages when logging on to our software systems, as well as mandatory training on information management which must be completed by everyone within the organisation.
“It is clear the panel has carefully considered the circumstances of each individual case before coming to their conclusion that three officers had no acceptable reason for looking at this information.”
Following the murder of Sarah Everard in March 2021, a dedicated taskforce of experienced investigators from the Met’s Directorate of Professional Standards carried out an audit of those who had accessed files relating to her disappearance and the subsequent investigation. The audit looked at whether those who had accessed these files did so with a proper policing purpose.
Investigators scrutinised each case to determine what the officer or staff member had viewed, the reasons and motivation they gave for such viewings and whether it had been externally shared.
This resulted in the seven officers above being served with gross misconduct notices and appearing in front of the hearing.
In total, 104 officers and staff (68 officers and 36 staff members) were initially identified as potentially accessing files relating to the investigation without a legitimate policing purpose.
+ All cases were examined and concluded as follows:
Gross misconduct hearing: Eight
Misconduct meeting – written warning issued: 10
Misconduct meeting – referred for reflective practice: 16
Misconduct meeting – no further action: Four
Reflective Practice (no requirement for referral to a misconduct meeting): 38
No further action (no requirement for a referral to a misconduct meeting): 28
Cases assessed as at the level of gross misconduct included those where the individual had inappropriately accessed a system and provided a non-plausible explanation for doing so, had accessed more than one system or accessed systems more than once, and/or was in a position of supervision, rank or responsibility.
Those who were subject to reflective practice attended bespoke, face-to-face sessions designed to improve their understanding about appropriate access to police systems.
DAC Cundy added: “The vast majority of those who had inappropriately accessed information admitted they had done so out of curiosity. When spoken to, they were remorseful, apologised, admitted poor judgement and were keen to engage in training. All of this was taken into account when determining the most appropriate outcome for each individual.
“We know that honest mistakes can be made and the most serious outcomes relate to those who were deliberately evasive or tried to avoid accountability. Those actions are not compatible with the values of the Met.”
Details of officers:
Proven to have breached standards of confidentiality, orders and instructions and discreditable conduct:
Sergeant Mark Harper, attached to Met Detention
PC Myles McHugh, attached to Roads and Transport Policing
Former T/Detective Constable Hannah Rebbeck, previously attached to South West BCU
Breaches not proven:
Detective Constable Tyrone Ward, then attached to South West BCU
Former Inspector Akinwale Ajose-Adeogun, previously attached to Met Detention
Former Detective Sergeant Robert Butters, previously attached to Central South BCU